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THE RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS ARE BEING
VIOLATED UNDER CALIFORNIA'S STATUTORY
SCHEME IN LIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT DECISION IN CABAN V.
MOHAMMED
I.

INTRODUCTION

Early in the 1970's, the United States Supreme Court began to recognize the rights of unwed fathers to maintain a
parent-child relationship with their children.1 Historically, an
unmarried father had little or no rights with respect to his
child, despite the fact that he had many responsibilities toward the child.2 Many states neither required that an unwed
father be notified of a pending adoption of his child, nor that
he be given an opportunity to be heard at such an adoption
proceeding.3 In the majority of states, the unwed father's consent to the adoption was irrelevant." Employing the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, the Court has accomplished a great deal during the last
decade to equalize the positions of unmarried fathers and
married fathers in terms of maintaining the parent-child relationship.' Unwed fathers, however, do not yet have full parental rights; furthermore, California appears to deny these fathers rights they are entitled to as found by the Supreme
Court.
0 1983 by Karen A. Koeppe
1. The terms unwed and unmarried are used throughout to refer to parents of a
child who are not married to each other. One or both of the parents may be married
to another person who is not the parent of the child.
2. Issac, Adopting a Child Today, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1071 (1966).
3. See Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's Parental Rights, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1581, 1584 n.20 (1972).
4. As of 1973, only 12 states, through statutes or case law, had provided for the
consent of the unwed father to his child's adoption. See Comment, Protecting the
Putative Father's Rights After Stanley v. Illinois: Problems in Implementation, 13
J. FAM. L. 115, 138-39 (1973).
5. See infra notes 7-26 and accompanying text.
6. In W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1979),
the Court of Appeal for the Second District upheld the constitutionality of CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 224, 7004, and 7017 which discriminate between natural mothers and fathers
for the purpose of unmarried parental consent to adoption. The unwed father is de-
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BACKGROUND

The unwed father now has many rights with respect to
his child. The following cases outline the development of the
unwed father's rights throughout the 1970's.
The Court first focused on the rights of unmarried fathers
in Stanley v. Illinois.1 Relying on both the equal protection
and the due process clauses of the Constitution, the Court
held that an unwed father's children may not be taken from
him before he has been afforded a fitness hearing similar to
the hearing given to all other parents. Under Illinois law, unmarried fathers were presumed unfit to raise their children,
while "married fathers-whether divorced, widowed, or separated-and mothers-even if unwed ... [were presumed] fit
to raise their children." 8 The Court struck down the presumption against unmarried fathers and held that under the due
process clause a finding of unfitness must be based on individualized proof.' Moreover, denying a fitness hearing to unmarried fathers while granting it to other parents is contrary to
the equal protection clause.10
In the 1978 decision of Quilloin v. Walcott," the Court
upheld a Georgia adoption statute 2 that gave only the unmarried mother the power to veto the adoption of her child.
Under the statute, however, the unwed father could obtain
the power to prevent his child's adoption simply by legitimating his child.' 8 In Quilloin, the child had remained in the cusprived of the right to withhold his consent where he and the mother have not attempted to marry each other, or where he has not received the child into his home
and openly held out the child as his natural child.
7. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
8. Id. at 647.
9. Id. at 649-58.

10. Id. at 658.
11. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
12. GA. CODE § 74-203 (1981 Revision) reads: "The mother of an illegitimate
child shall be entitled to the possession of the child, unless the father shall legitimate
him as before provided. Being the only recognized parent, she may exercise all the
parental power." (Georgia incorporates the chapter with the section of the code.
Chapter 74, section 203 is, thus, referred to as § 74-203).
13. Legitimation entails merely petitioning the court to declare the child
legitimate.
A father of an illegitimate child may render the same legitimate by petitioning the superior court of the county of his residence for legitimation
of the child. The petition shall set forth the name, age, and sex of the

child, the name of the mother, and, if the father desires the name of the
child to be changed, the new name. If the mother is alive, she shall have
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tody of his mother since his birth, and the father had not
sought to legitimate his son until the petition for adoption
was filed by the mother's husband. As the natural father had
not taken on any of the daily supervision or care of his child
and was not seeking custody, the Court had no difficulty finding that the interests of such fathers are distinguishable from
the interests of divorced or married fathers. Equal protection
principles, according to the Court, do not require that unwed
attributes be given equal rights to veto
fathers with Quilloin's
14
an adoption.

Along with Stanley and Quilloin, the Court has decided
several cases dealing with gender-based discrimination which
have been instrumental in securing the rights of unmarried
fathers. Reed v. Reed" established that classifications based
on sex are "subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause." 6 While the Court has not yet applied strict scrutiny
to gender-based classifications, in Frontiero v. Richardson,17 a
plurality of the Court held that sex constitutes a suspect classification, and that gender-based distinctions are subject to
strict scrutiny."' However, as a majority vote was not obtained
notice of the petition for legitimation ....
GA. CODE § 19-7-22 (1982 Revision).

14.
15.

434 U.S. at 255-56.
404 U.S. 71 (1971).

16. Id. at 75.
17. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See Note, Frontiero v. Richardson: Characterization
of Sex-Based Classification,6 COLUM. HUM. RIGHTS L. REV. 239 (1974); Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-United States Supreme Court In Plurality Opinion
Names Sex a Suspect Classification Requiring Compelling Interest Test-Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 69 (1973); Note, Constitutional Law-Fifth Amendment Due Process-Sex Discrimination-SuspectClassification, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 982 (1974).
18. Justices Douglas, Marshall, and White joined Justice Brennan's opinion
which held that sex is an inherently suspect class, and therefore, subject to strict
scrutiny. 411 U.S. at 682. Justice Stewart, in a separate opinion, concurred in the
Court's holding that the statutes at issue were invalid under Reed v. Reed as invidious discrimination. Id. at 691. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, and
Justice Blackmun, noted that because the Equal Rights Amendment had been submitted to the states for ratification and would resolve the issue, deciding whether sex
should be a suspect class would result in judicial pre-emption of the legislative process. Id. at 691-92.
For an excellent discussion of the intricacies of the Frontierodecision see Comment, Frontiero v. Richardson, Uniform Services Fringe Benefit Statute Which
Presumes Spouses of Male Members to be Dependent, but Requires Spouses of Female Members to be Dependent in Fact, is Violative of Due Process, 5 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 295 (1974); Comment, Plurality of Court Decides that Sex-Based Classifications
are "Suspect." Frontiero v. Richardson, 5 RUT.-CAM. L. REV. 348 (1973).
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in this case, that level of scrutiny has not been applied." Instead, the Court has applied an intermediate level of scrutiny20 as articulated in Craig v. Boren :21 "To withstand constitutional
challenge,
previous
cases establish
that
classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."2 2 A statute dealing with unwed parental consent to adoption, which distinguishes one class of
parents from another on the basis of sex must therefore be
substantially related to furthering important state interests.
In 1979, a major breakthrough occurred for fathers who
had not been required to consent to the adoption of their children. In Caban v. Mohammed,2 3 the Supreme Court overturned a New York adoption statute that required the consent
of both the parents before their child could be adopted, if that
child had been born in wedlock.2 If that child had not been
born in wedlock, only the unmarried mother's consent was required. The Court found that this statute clearly distinguished between unmarried parents who were male and those
who were female. 5 Additionally, the Court determined that
this sex based distinction bore no substantial relationship to
19. See Lombard, Sex: A Classification in Search of Strict Scrutiny, 21 WAYNE
L. REV. 1355 (1975); Comment, Sex Discriminationand Equal Protection:An Analysis of Constitutional Approaches to Achieve Equal Rights for Women, 38 ALB. L.
REV. 66 (1973).
20. Classifications falling under the intermediate level of scrutiny must be substantially related to furthering important state interests. For a discussion of the three
levels of scrutiny applied by the Court and specifically the development of the intermediate level of scrutiny see Weinhaus, Substantive Rights Of The Unwed Father:
The Boundaries are Defined, 19 J. FAM. L. 445 (1980); Comment, Caban v. Mohammed: Extending The Rights Of Unwed Fathers, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 95 (1979);
Comment, Gender-Based Discrimination and a Developing Standard of Equal Protection Analysis, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 572 (1977); Note, Adoption: The Constitutional
Rights of Unwed Fathers,40 LA. L. REV. 923 (1980).
21. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
22. Id. at 197.
23. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
24.

See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977) which provides that:

"[C]onsent to adoption shall be required as follows: ...(b) Of the parents or surviving parent, whether adult or infant, of a child born in wedlock; [and] (c) Of the
mother whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock ...."
25. 441 U.S. at 388. The Court said that it was clear that section 111 treated
unmarried parents differently according to their sex from the fact that the father
could not adopt his children without their mother's consent, whereas adoption by the
mother could be blocked only if the father could show that the adoption would not be
in the children's best interests.
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any important state interest, and therefore, was in violation of
fourteenth amendment equal protection principles. 6
III.

THE CALIFORNIA CASE AND STATUTORY SCHEME

California's adoption statutes2 7 are similar to New York's
invalidated statute in their treatment of unmarried parental
consent for the purpose of adoption. In view of Caban, one
would have expected California's adoption statutes to fall
when challenged on constitutional grounds in the state's
courts. This was not the case in W.E.J. v. Superior Court,5
however.
A.

Facts of W.E.J.

On August 23, 1978 Baby Boy G. was born to an unwed
couple-Falaniko L., the father, and Janis G., the mother.2 9
The next day, the mother released their baby to William and
Virginia J., and they filed a petition for adoption of Baby Boy
G. Falaniko, however, appeared in the proceeding seeking custody of his child in order to adopt the child. His wife, Margaret L., who was unable to bear children, testified that she
wanted, and would love her husband's child despite the circumstances of the child's conception. The superior court
granted custody to the father. From the language of the trial
court's ruling, the Court of Appeal reasoned that the trial
court must have concluded that Falaniko was entitled to a
grant of custody in light of Caban.s° Once granted custody,
Falaniko by definition would become a presumed father and
would then be in a position to block the adoption of Baby Boy
G. by witholding his consent."
26. Id. at 388-94.
27. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 224, 7004, and 7017 (West 1975). These statutes provide
that an unwed father cannot block the adoption of his child by withholding his consent unless he is a presumed father. To become a presumed father, he must have gone
through an apparently valid marriage ceremony with the mother or taken the child
into his home and held the child out as his natural child.
28. 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1979).
29. Id. at 305-06, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
30. Id. at 306-07, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
31. Id. at 307, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 864. Under CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(4) (West
Supp. 1982), an unwed father may object to the adoption of his child by withholding
his consent only if he is a presumed father. An unwed father will become a presumed
father if he obtains custody of his child.
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B. Comparison of New York's Invalidated Statute and the
California Statutory Scheme at Issue in W.E.J.-Similar but
not Indentical
Under the invalid New York law, parents were treated
differently for the purpose of unwed parental consent to adoption on the basis of sex. The statute reads in pertinent part:
"[C]onsent to adoption shall be required as follows: . . .(b)
Of the parents or surviving parent, whether adult or infant, of
a child born in wedlock; [and] (c) Of the mother, whether
adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock .... Since
the state was unable to show that the distinction between the
rights of unmarried fathers and unmarried mothers was substantially related to an important state interest, this statute
fell as "another example of 'overbroad generalizations' in gender-based classifications.""3 Adoption by the father was impermissible without the mother's consent-whether she was
married or not-yet the unmarried father could block an
adoption by the mother only if he could show that such adoption was not in the best interest of the child."'
The more complicated California statutory scheme at issue in W.E.J. produces results similar to those of the unconstitutional New York statute. California Civil Code section
224 states that: "A child having a presumed father.. . cannot
be adopted without the consent of its parents if living .... ,
The adoption of a child without a presumed father, however,
would only require the mother's consent.3 6 An unmarried father will qualify as a presumed father under section 7004(a) if
he has gone through an apparently valid marriage ceremony
with the mother, or taken the child into his home and held
S
the child out as his natural child. 7
It is evident that unlike New York's statutes, the California statutory scheme does allow some unmarried fathers to
object to the adoption of their children. The court of appeal
in W.E.J. seems to have reasoned that because of this difference, the California statutes are saved from being unconstitutional under Caban. Requiring the consent of only those un32.

N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977).

33. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 394.
34.

Id. at 385-87.

35. CAL. CIV. CODE § 224 (West 1982).
36. CAL. CIv. CODE § 7017 (West Supp. 1982).
37. CAL. CIv. CODE § 7004 (West Supp. 1982).

19831

RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS

married fathers who meet the narrow criteria of presumed
fathers is not enough to prevent the California statutes from
resulting in overbroad gender-based discrimination.38 The fact
remains that all mothers, regardless of their marital status,
must give their consent before an adoption can take place, but
not all fathers are allowed this right.
IV.

CALIFORNIA'S STATUTES FALL SHORT OF

Caban

REQUIREMENTS
Several justifications for upholding the California statutory scheme are offered by the court of appeal in W.E.J. First,
the court points out that there is a notice provision under California law regarding proceedings to terminate parental control; therefore the state has not violated Stanley.39 In a further attempt to buttress its position, the court analogized
California's statutes to those of Georgia's which were upheld
in Quilloin. Finally, the W.E.J. court alludes to a possible important state interest behind the classification created by the
California statutes-protecting the child from a parent who
would veto his adoption on a basis other than the best interests of the child-but fails to demonstrate how the classifica40
tion is substantially related to this articulated interest. If
the gender-based distinction is not substantially related to an
important state interest, the core requirement of Caban, then
the statute would be unconstitutional.'
A. Notice Requirement
The court in W.E.J. pointed out that the California statutes meet the requirement of due process as articulated in
Stanley. Due process requires notice to the natural father and
38. The criteria is so difficult for unwed fathers to meet that in fact, all the
mother has to do is say no to the father's proposal of marriage and refuse to allow
him to take the child into his home in order to frustrate his efforts to become a
presumed father. See also W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d at 323, 160 Cal.
Rptr. at 875 (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
39. Apparently, the court of appeal was not offering the fact that before custody
can be revoked the custodial parent is given notice, as a justification for denying unwed fathers without custody the power to veto an adoption. Instead, the court of
appeal was pointing out that California has followed the guideline set up by the Supreme Court in Stanley.
40. W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d at 314-15, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 86970.
41. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children may be
42
taken from him. Section 235 of the California Civil Code
does provide for an extensive service of process if an action to
have a minor declared free from parental control is initiated.
The termination of parental control proceedings, however, are
not directly related to adoption proceedings involving nonpresumed fathers. The unwed father, if he is a non-presumed
father, by definition does not have custody of his child. He
would therefore not be entitled to notice under section 235.
The court of appeal was apparently addressing the entire Uniform Parentage Act when it pointed out that the California
law meets the Stanley requirements. 3
B. The Georgia Statutes
The court of appeal in W.E.J. attempted to support the
California statutes by likening them to the Georgia adoption
statutes upheld by the Supreme Court in Quilloin. In Georgia,
as in California, only the unmarried mother has the power to
veto the adoption of her child. 4 According to the majority in
W.E.J., Quilloin "illustrates the principle that a father whose
relationship to the child is only biological may be treated differently from a father who has established a family relationship with the child and mother."' 5 The court, however, neglects to mention that to obtain veto power in Georgia, the
father of the illegitimate child need only petition the court to
42. CAL. CIv. CODE § 235 (West 1982) requires that in an action to have a minor
declared free from parental custody and control, service of citation is to be delivered
to:
(a) The father or mother of such minor person, if his or her place of
residence is known to the petitioner, or if the place of residence of such
father or mother is not known to the petitioner, then the grandparents
and adult brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, and first cousins of such minor
person, if there are any and if their residences and relationships to such
person are known to the petitioner, shall be notified of the proceedings
by service of a citation advising such person or persons that they may
appear at the time and place stated in such citation . . . . (b) If the
father or mother of such minor person or any person alleged to be or

claiming to be the father or mother cannot, with reasonable diligence be
served as provided in subdivision (a), or if his or her place of residence
is not known to the petitioner . . .the court shall make an order that
service be made by publication ...
43. W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d at 313, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
44. GA. CODE § 74-203 [19-7-25] (1982).
45. See W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d at 313, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
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legitimate his child under the Georgia statute.4 a Thus, Quilloin stands more for the proposition that fathers who have not
undertaken the simple task of legitimating their children may
be treated differently from those fathers who have done so.
Furthermore, as Justice Jefferson pointed out in his dissent in W.E.J. the holding in Quilloin was based on the particular fact situation before the Court at the time. 47 In Quilloin the child sought to be adopted was twelve years old when
the case came to trial. The father, Quilloin, had not sought to
legitimate his child during the child's first eleven years. Only
after the mother's husband filed a petition for the adoption of
the child did Quilloin petition the Georgia court to have his
child legitimated. Moreover, Quilloin was not even seeking
custody of his child at the time. His only objection was to the
mother's husband's adoption of the child-he did not mind if
the child continued to live with the mother and her husband.
Thus, the Court upheld the Georgia statutes as applied to
Quilloin.
C. Promoting the Child's Best Interests
Caban requires that a gender-based classification be substantially related or "closely attuned" to an important state
interest.48 W.E.J. suggests that the important state interest at
stake is the protection of a child from a parent who would
veto the child's adoption on bases other than a natural parental interest in the child's welfare.4 9 According to W.E.J., California's classifications based on the attempted marriage and
the undertaking of the care of the child, "contain a substantial proportion of fathers who are strangers to the child and
whose objection to adoption will be based on something other
46. See GA. CODE § 74-103 [19-7-22] (1982).
47. W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d at 325, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
48. 441 U.S. at 392-93 n.13; see also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971). The
standard that gender-based discrimination must meet to withstand constitutional
challenge has been firmly entrenched by innumerable cases both in the federal and
state courts. The following is a list of United States Supreme Court cases which have
referred to this standard: Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Califano v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
49. W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d at 314, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
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than a mature consideration of the child's best interest." 50
Thus, the court concludes that the presumed fathers classification "does not go substantially beyond the protection of
[the state's] interest."5 1
The classification created by the California statutes is too
broad to achieve the state's interest in protecting children
from parents who do not have their children's best interests in
mind when seeking to prevent an adoption. The distinction
drawn between unwed fathers who are presumed fathers and
those who are not, precludes many genuinely concerned fathers from effectively objecting to an adoption. The statutes
also allow mothers to prevent unmarried fathers from becoming presumed fathers, regardless of how much interest such
fathers may have shown in their children's welfare.
1. Objection is the Result of a Natural Parental
Interest
While the court in W.E.J. agreed with the legislature that
"non-presumed fathers" will be strangers to their children
and will block an adoption based on considerations not in
such children's best interests,52 the Supreme Court in Caban
considered the fact that unmarried fathers may object to
adoptions if given the power to do so and found no basis to
believe that this objection would be the result of anything
other than a concern for the best interests of the child. As the
Court pointed out, an unwed father's objection to an adoption
"usually is the result of a natural parental interest shared by
both genders alike; it is not a manifestation of any profound
and concern of mothers and
difference between the affection
53
fathers for their children.

There is no apparent reason to believe that only fathers
who have married their child's mother or who have under50. Id.
51. Id. at 315.
52. In support of its assertion, the court even relies on the facts of Caban suggesting that since Caban had lived with his children and their mother for several
years, he would have qualified as a presumed father in California. 100 Cal. App. 3d at
314, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 869. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(4). Thus, Caban could have
blocked the adoption of his children had they lived in California. The W.E.J. majority, however, ignores the fact that Caban invalidated New York's statute as overbroad
and as such Caban's facts are only of secondary importance. California statutes must
satisfy the substantial relationship test.
53. 441 U.S. at 391-92.

1983]

RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS

909

taken to care for the child in a common home have a natural
parental interest in the welfare of their children. Concern for
a child may be manifested in numerous ways in addition to
those required by the California statutes. Although California
requires an actual marriage ceremony to have taken place between the parents, concern may be manifested even if the attempt at marriage by the father is not successful. A father
who has tried to gain custody of his child but has failed is also
manifesting concern for that child. The distinction drawn by
the California statutes goes substantially beyond the protection of the articulated state interests by depriving many deserving fathers of the ability to block their children's
adoptions.
2. Loving Fathers may be Excluded While Alienated
Mothers are Given Power to Cut Off Fathers' Rights
In addition to the fact that there is no evidence that nonpresumed fathers would be more likely than presumed fathers
to veto adoptions without having the child's best interests in
mind, California's statutory scheme precludes many deserving
fathers from obtaining such veto power. A loving father can be
excluded from the decision as to who will be able to adopt his
child by a mother who has severed her connection with their
child immediately after the child's birth. 4 These fathers may
have done all they possibly can to demonstrate their willingness to take responsibility for their children, yet they cannot
qualify for presumed father status. The classification that precludes these fathers is the same one that was intended to protect the children from parents who would block the adoption
without the child's welfare in mind.
The inequity of the invalidated New York statute in
Caban is the same inequity present in the California statutes.
New York's classification "both excludes some loving fathers
from full participation in the decision whether their children
will be adopted and, at the same time, enables some alienated
'55
mothers arbitrarily to cut off the paternal rights of fathers.
The focus of adoption legislation should be on whether the
child's parent is genuinely concerned with the best interests of
54. The mother of the baby in W.E.J. released her child to another couple the
day after the child's birth. 100 Cal. App. 3d at 306, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
55. 441 U.S. at 394.
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that child. Whether the unwed parent is a female or a male
should not be a determining factor.
Under the California statutes, a father who asked the
mother to marry him or who has offered to take his child into
his home and support that child may be prevented from obtaining presumed father status merely by the mother's refusal
to accept his offers. In Adoption of Marie R.,5 the same court
that decided W.E.J. ruled that such offers are not enough to
qualify the man as a presumed father, regardless of his efforts
in that respect. 7 The facts of Marie R. are similar to those of
W.E.J. Immediately after Marie R.'s birth, her unmarried
mother released her to a couple who wished to adopt her. The
child's purported father attempted to intervene, however, offering to support and take his daughter into his home. This
offer was refused by the mother. At the adoption proceeding,
the father objected, contending that he should qualify as a
presumed father on the basis of his efforts to take his child
into his home. The majority found that only the mother's consent was required for the adoption, holding the mother's frustration of the father's efforts immaterial. The court rejected
the argument that such effort amounted to a constructive taking of the child into the father's home which would qualify
him for presumed father status.58 The court pointed out that
a "mother may, by her conduct, prevent a natural father from
securing even the minimal contact with the child .... Absent
even the minimal contact . . . there can be no receipt, con-

structive or otherwise, into the home of a purported father."59
The injustice done to a concerned and loving father by
this classification cannot be expressed with any more emphasis than was done in the W.E.J. dissent.
The invidious nature of the classification upheld by the
majority in the instant case is that the unmarried
mother-who does not want the custody of her child and
the responsibility which goes with such custody-is given
the right to consent to an adoption of the child by
nonparents and also the right to effectively preclude the
unmarried father from obtaining custody and vetoing an
adoption simply by frustrating all efforts of the father to
56.
57.
58.
59.

79 Cal. App. 3d 624, 145 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1978).
Id. at 630, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
But see id. at 631-38, 145 Cal Rptr. at 126-30 (Jefferson, J. dissenting).
Id. at 630, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
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obtain custody and thus put himself into a position where
his consent to an adoption is required as a presumed natural father .... 60
D.

Other State Interests

Aside from protecting a child's best interests, there are
two possible state interests that may be promoted by an adoption statute. First, delay can result in the adoption process if
the consent of an unavailable father is required, although the
statutes do not directly seek to prevent this delay. Second, an
adoption statute can be drawn so as to foster the parent-child
relationship as an important state interest. However, the California statutory scheme does not promote such relationships;
consequently, the spirit of the Uniform Parentage Act has not
been carried forth.6 California's statutes therefore, are not
substantially related to either of these interests.
1. Classificationnot Drawn to CurtailProblem of Delay
Caban v. Mohammed discussed a possible state interest
in avoiding the delay which might result if the consent of absent unmarried fathers is required to an adoption of their
children.2 The California statutory scheme is not substantially related to facilitating adoptions by avoiding this delay,
however. Searching for fathers whose whereabouts are not
known would result in considerable delay in the adoption process and could foreseeably cause some adoption petitions to
be dropped.6 3 Although the court in W.E.J. did not discuss
the stagnation problem, the Supreme Court in Caban indicated that a statutory classification could be drawn which
60. 100 Cal. App. 3d at 324, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
61. See CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 7000-7018 (West 1975).
Under the Uniform Parentage Act . . . the "child and parent relationships" extend equally to every child and to every parent regardless of
the marital status of the parent. All statutory references to "legitimacy"
and "illegitimacy" are eliminated. The major premise of the Act is to
provide for substantive equality of children regardless of the status of
the parents. The right-duty relationship existing between the parent
and child are equalized without reference to the marital status without
regard to sex.
Griffith v. Gibson, 73 Cal. App. 3d 465, 470, 142 Cal. Rptr. 176, 179 (1977) (footnotes
omitted).
62. 441 U.S. at 390-91.
63. Id.
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would avoid this problem by not requiring the consent of
those unmarried fathers who had never come forward and
shown an interest in their children." It is obvious from the
facts of W.E.J. that the California statutes have a greater effect than merely avoiding the impediment of locating the unwed father to secure his consent. In W.E.J. the father's whereabouts were well known. He was in court seeking custody of
his child and seeking to prevent his child's adoption. Yet, this
father was precluded from exercising any veto power over the
adoption. The statutes make no distinction between the unmarried father who has come forward and is seeking custody
and those fathers who have not. Therefore, the classification is
not substantially related to the facilitation of adoptions.
2. Policy Behind the Uniform Parentage Act
The California statutes here at issue are part of the Uniform Parentage Act 6" adopted by California in 1976. As the
dissent in W.E.J. points out, the public policy behind the Act
was to eliminate promotion of legitimacy as an important
state interest.6 6 Promoting the parent-child relationship,
legitimacy as an
whether the parent is married or not replaces
67
Act.
the
important state interest under
The California statutes are not substantially related to
promoting the establishment of the parent-child relationship
as envisioned by the Act. Under the classification created by
these statutes, the unwed father in many cases is unable to
develop a relationship with his child because he, through no
fault of his own, will be unable to qualify for presumed father
status under section 7004. Depriving the unwed father of his
chance to develop a parent-child relationship simply because
the mother has decided to forego her opportunity to develop
such a relationship and has prevented the father from gaining
custody, is non-justifiable.
64.

Id. at 392.

65.

See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 7000-7018 (West 1975).

100 Cal. App. 3d at 317-18, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72.
67. See id. at 311, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 862; Adoption of Marie R., 79 Cal. App. 3d
624, 626, 145 Cal. Rptr. 122, 123-124 (1978).
66.
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CALIFORNIA'S STATUTES SHOULD BE REWRITTEN TO BRING

THEM INTO COMPLIANCE WITH THE HOLDING IN Caban

California's statutes which deal with unwed parental consent to adoption are not substantially related to an important

state interest, and therefore, should be rewritten so as to comply with the Caban decision. These statutes dealing with unmarried parental consent to adoption should promote the parent-child relationship in the spirit of the Uniform Parentage
Act. Additionally, the legislature should strive to ensure that
all interests are protected by the distinctions drawn; including
those of the state, the unmarried father and mother, and the
child. Finally, every classification should be substantially related to the furtherance of important state interests.
A.

Proposed Statutory Revisions

It may be that aligning the California statutes with the
Supreme Court's mandate in Caban entails no revision at all.
The court in W.E.J. refused to interpret section 7017(d) of
the California Civil Code as requiring a grant of custody to a
natural father who requests such custody for the purpose of
qualifying as a presumed father enabling him to veto his
child's adoption. If a higher court were to find that a trial
court must grant custody to an unwed father who requests
such custody for the purpose of qualifying as a presumed father, then the statutes would comply with Caban.
Alternatively, the legislature could amend the statutes to
require giving an unmarried father custody of his child when
he asks for it so that he can become a presumed father. Since
those unmarried fathers with an interest in their children
would manifest this interest by seeking custody of their children, they would no longer be prevented from obtaining veto
power over the adoption of their children.
Another possible solution to the constitutional dilemma
presented by the California statutes would be to enact a statute requiring both parents' consent to the adoption of their
child in all cases. Such a statute would completely avoid the
problem of gender-based distinctions. Requiring both parents'
consent, however, raises other problems which would make
this requirement undesirable. As previously discussed, there
would be a delay problem in securing the consent of fathers
whose whereabouts were unknown. The situation might also
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arise where the unmarried father, who has not lived up to his
support obligations and has not manifested any interest in the
child, would be allowed to prevent the adoption merely by
withholding his consent. He should be required to show that
the adoption is not in the best interests of the child.
Another alternative would be to require the consent of
both the mother and the father where he has sought custody
of his child or has sought to adopt his child and the mother
has frustrated his efforts to do so. 6 8 This requirement would
be substantially related to the furthering of the important
state interest of allowing only those parents with a genuine
interest in their children's well-being to veto an adoption.
Those fathers who have a natural parental interest in their
children will have manifested this interest by seeking custody
or adoption and they will not be precluded from exercising
their power to withhold consent if they object to the adoption.
The mother will not be forced to retain custody of a child she
cannot or does not want to support by a father who has been
unwilling to take responsibility for the child. If the father has
not sought to obtain custody or to adopt the child and the
mother has not frustrated the father's efforts to do so, then
only the mother's consent would be required. Additionally, if
the father is turned down after a finding of unfitness as a parent, his consent to an adoption would not be necessary."
VI.

CONCLUSION

California's statutory scheme dealing with unwed paren68. There are, of course, many possible variations of these proposed revisions.
The scope of this comment, however, does not permit full development of each one.
For a further discussion of statutory revision in light of Caban, see Note, Putative
Fathers: Unwed, but no Longer Unprotected, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 425 (1980).
69. There are two other possibilities for adoption statutes, but they are not viable alternatives. The first possibility would be to draft a statute requiring only the
consent of one parent to the adoption-regardless of sex or who has custody. Besides
being unconstitutional, this alternative is highly undesirable. Stanley v. Illinois established that a hearing on the fitness of the parent must be held before custody is
terminated. 405 U.S. at 649-53. If only one parent's consent were to be required, the
father or mother could relinquish all parental rights to the child-regardless of
whether the other parent had manifested an interest in the child.
The second possibility would be to enact a statute foregoing the consent requirement altogether. Although such a statute would speed up the adoption process, this
statute would similarly be unconstitutional under Stanley because the custodial parent must be given notice and a fitness hearing before custody of his children may be
terminated. Id.
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tal consent to adoption requires redrafting. This comment has
attempted to delineate the precautions which should be taken
when the legislature draws distinctions between classes of unmarried parents for the purpose of determining whether or
not the parent's consent to adoption is necessary. The spirit
of the Uniform Parentage Act should be a major consideration. Classifications should be created to promote the parentchild relationship-regardless of the parent's sex or marital
status. The consent of those parents who have manifested a
genuine parental interest in their children should be required
before an adoption of their children can take place. The legislature does not, however, have to give all parents the power to
object to an adoption by withholding their consent. For example, an unknown or unavailable parent's consent need not be
secured, enabling the state to avoid the problem of delaying
the adoption proceeding. Great care should be taken, however,
to ensure that these limitations do not discriminate against
parents who have done all that they possibly can to provide a
home for their children. These parents should have a meaningful say in who can and cannot adopt their children. California's statutory scheme presently does not allow fathers who
have a sincere parental interest in the well-being of their children to object to an adoption by withholding their consent.
The rights of unwed fathers are, therefore, being violated
under California's statutory scheme in light of the recent
United States Supreme Court decision in Caban v.
Mohammed.
Karen A. Koeppe

